Social construction of identity

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY

Dr. Rusli, S.Ag., M.Soc.Sc

Lecturer of STAIN Datokarama Palu

Jl. Diponegoro No. 23 Palu Sulawesi Tengah

Sociologists argue that identity refers to how individuals and groups define themselves and their relations to others (Kidd, 2002: 24). Many definitions begin with so-called “objective” factors given at birth, such as race, ethnicity and sex. In this view, it is argued that men will always identify as men, as well as women, Aboriginal people will always identify as Aboriginal, and so on. Identity -be it individual or collective, is not natural, permanent and fixed, although people themselves often feel they are. But it is the product of the historical processes and experiences through which individuals and groups come to see themselves, their place in the world, and their relationship with those around them (Castells, 1997: 6). As a social and cultural construct, the creation and construction of identity is influenced by factors such as beliefs, ideas, norms and practices. In addition, modernity, which is characterized by the growth of information technology, plays a powerful role in constructing identities (Kidd, 2002). In particular community, responses to modernity vary according to how traditional and modern people perceive it. For a group of people, modernity is seen as a threat for their identity, therefore, they make any effort to resist it. This may apply to fundamentalism movement in every religious community, as is available in Hindus, Christians, Jewish, Buddhist, and Muslims.

As already known, in the community where religion is one part of identity, we often find the categorization of society into traditionalist-conservative and modernist-liberal. This is particularly due to the fact that every religion has seeds of criticism and resistance. In a Christian community, for instance, there are Catholic and Protestant groups as a social response to the theology of Christianity. Amongst Hindus, we find some groups that have made every effort to maintain the faith and traditions on one hand, and those that modernize their faith as has happened in India and Bali. The same is also true of Islam. There has been a struggle between those wanting to maintain Islamic traditions and those wanting to modernize the Islamic faith. As a result, conflicts and tensions have emerged between the two opposing groups. In this paper, the writer will study how religion; that is, Islam, plays a role in the construction of Islamic identity, be it conservative and liberal. The question, then, is precisely how and why these Islamic identities are formed.

In Indonesia, it can be argued that the Muslim community can be divided into Customary Islam, Revivalist Islam and Liberal Islam. Customary Islam describes Muslims whose religiosity is still mixed with local cultures and traditions (Kurzman: 1998). In the Indonesian context, this community can be traced back to the society that use dupa (special perfumes) at night, which is perceived as “sacral”, and also visit most often shrines and “sacral” tombs on particular days. Within Geertz’s (1976) typology, this group is referred to as Islam Javanists.

Revivalist Islam refers to a group of people who hold that Islam is a comprehensive religion. As a sacred book of Muslims, Al-Quran does not ignore social, economic, and political affairs. This group strongly refuses the practices, which are perceived as contradictory to Islam. Their understanding of Islam is literalist and scripturalist (Platzdasch, 2001). They accept what is stated textually; rarely interpreting the spirit of the religious texts. They wish for the implementation of Islamic sharia totally and comprehensively (kaffah) and they believe it can be achieved if there is an Islamic state. In Indonesia, the Holy War Army or Laskar Jihad, the Defender Front of Islam or FPI (Front Pembela Islam), the Movement of Indonesian Mujahidin or AMIN (Angkatan Mujahidin Indonesia), and the Liberation Party or Hizbut Tahrir can be incorporated into this group. Some scholars refer to this movement as “fundamentalist” (Halliday, 1994). However, there are other scholars refusing the use of this term to describe the dynamics of radical movements. Esposito (1998), for instance, avoided using this term since, he argued, it was misleading because this movement is a cyclical phenomenon throughout history. Many intellectuals prefer to use terms like “Islamism” (Sayid, 1997)  or “political Islam,” (Esposito, 1998) or “militant Islam,” (Jansen, 1976) or “Islamic resurgence” (Nash, 1991) or “Islamic revival” (Piscatori, 1986).

Regarding women, this group limits women sexuality and roles. This group is strongly opposed the lifestyle offered by the West. The West and its way of life are seen as threatening Muslim women’s identiy. Women’s duty is in the private sphere such as childrearing and housework. Women sexuality is controlled by compulsory veiling or “hijab.” Women must wear headscarf or hijab as a symbol of identity, privacy and modesty. However, in some Muslim countries, Islamic veiling has cultural and political connotation as it is in Iran, Algeria, and Turkey (El-Guindi, 1996; Gole, 2000).

Liberal Islam, as Kurzman (1998: 13-18) describes, is divided into three models; the liberal sharia, the silent sharia and the interpreted sharia. The first model assumes that “the sharia itself is liberal if interpreted properly.” The liberal nature of the sharia is inherent in the Al-Quran and has been proven in history. This means that Islam provides some basic, universal principles of solutions to such global problems as democracy, human rights, gender relations, and relations of inter-religious communities, as stipulated by the Medina Charter (Mitsaq al-Madinah) at the period of the Prophet Muhammad. The silent sharia holds that “the sharia is silent on certain topics” meaning that there are certain aspects that are not discussed in detail by the sharia. This makes it possible for Muslims to adopt outside models that have to do with public domains, such as forms of state. The interpreted sharia assumes that the sharia contains divine values, but human interpretations of these values are relative. Therefore, the interpretations, which are perceived as biased and deviant from the basic principle of the Quran such as justice and equality, should be reconstructed in order that justice is achieved, particularly in the interpretation of gender relations.

Each different mainstream creates different identities. Fundamentalists or revivalists argue that to be true Muslim, he or she must behave according to the literal meaning of sharia. This group believes that Islam is the only solution to the socio-religious problems that Muslims deal with. Therefore, this group is known as radical and conservative in its religiosity and its relationship with non-Muslims as well. Liberal Islam tends to focus more on the substance of Islam than its literal meaning. Therefore, this group tends to be more moderate in its relationship with non-Muslims and open to Western knowledge and civilisation.

The reasons behind the emergence of these different identities may refer to two significant factors, internal and external. The internal factor is one that is inherent in the Islamic teaching itself, where Islam is a multi-interpretative religion. The Al-Quran, as a primary source, by nature contains multiple meanings. We can easily find in the Al-Quran references to republicanism, monarchy, democracy and authoritarianism. Human beings are just agents in understanding the purposes of the sacred texts. Since the intellectual capacities and psychological conditions of human beings are different, differences emerge in the interpretation. Some tend to understand and hold the literal meaning of the text; therefore, “literalist” or “scripturalist” groups emerge(Liddle, 1996), while others tend to look at the substance and essence of the text, so, the “liberal” or “substantialist” groups come into being.

The external factors would be, first of all, modernization and modernity. The emergence of Islamic radicalism and liberalism in Indonesia is inseparable from this modernity. They differ in responding to modernity, which comes particularly from the west.  There is no doubt that modernity brought about changes in the social structures of the society –be it negative or positive. “Radical” or “fundamentalist” (the term mostly used by the West) or “revivalist Islam” perceives modernity as destructive of Muslim morality and ethics. This is also regarded as the “Anti-God movement.” Modernity, in this group’s point of view, has led to a crisis of identity and morality among Muslims, which, in turn has caused them to become deprived and alienated. Therefore, they most often regard this era as “Jahiliyah modern” (the Modern Age of Darkness). As a result, the struggle to resist modernity surfaces in a variety of forms and at number of level  -be they personal or political.  At the individual level, there is an increase in “devotion” or santri-isation (literally ‘becoming more devout’) which is manifested in such things as increasing participation in prayer and pilgrimage, greater observance of fasting during the month of Ramadhan and payment of alms tax, growth in mystical order and in the circles of Islamic learning (halaqah) as we could find in the Mosque of Salman in the Institute of Technology Bandung or ITB, the Mosque of Arief Rachman Hakim in the University of Indonesia or UI, and other mosques around Indonesian campuses (Fealy, 2001). This heightened religiosity was also accompanied by an increased use of head covering and modest dress for women, particularly in urban areas. At the political level, there has been a significant increase in awareness of the significance of the implementation of Islamic shari’a in all aspects of life. This has generated a radical and conservative orientation. Some of devout Muslims chose, among others, the Justice Party or PK (Partai Keadilan) as their political basis, while others used radical movements to islamise public policies and establish an Islamic state. However, there are also positive responses to modernity, particularly from Muslims who were educated at western universities. They argued that Islam is not in contradiction with modernity. They were, thus, referred to as followers of Cultural Islam that is more pluralist and open to western knowledge and civilisation.

The other factor would be the increasing number of students who were sent to study not only in Mecca and Medina, but also in Cairo, particularly in the early twentieth century. Cairo with Al-Azhar University has long been known as the centre of Islamic learning. Most graduates returning home brought knowledge that was influenced by Muhammad Abduh, who was considered as a symbol for a reformed Islam (Steenbrink, 1997). These graduates, to some extent, play a role in colouring Islamic thought in Indonesia –be they conservative or moderate. In addition, many students from the Islamic boarding school, such as Gontor, were sent to study in western universities, such as Chicago, McGill, and Leiden University in the Netherlands, which is still continuing as the Netherlands-Indonesian Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS) (Steenbrink, 1997). These graduates including, among others, Nurcholis Madjid (Chicago) and Amien Rais (Chicago), are known as the figures who have presented a more humanist and pluralist Islam, and who are concerned with human rights issues and fiercely criticize the government (Aditjondro, 1997). Therefore, in the history of Islamic discourse, they are regarded as Substantialists or Liberal Islam.

Conclusion

Identity, which refers to how individuals or a group of people define themselves in relation with others, is not natural, fixed and eternal. Rather it is a social and cultural product. The creation of identity is inseparable from ideas, beliefs, norms and other factors, such as technology, media, and so on. Religion as a collection of norms and ideas play a role in constructing identity. In Indonesia, Islam as a collection of norms and ideas contributes to the creation of traditional-conservative (radicalism) and moderate-liberal.

The reasons behind the emergence of radicalism and liberalism in Islam may be the Islamic teaching itself that is multi-interpretive. There is no single interpretation in Islam. Therefore, it is inevitable that “scripturalist” and “substantialist” trends emerge. The different responses to modernity and the growth of santri studying in Mecca, Medina and Egypt, on the one hand, and in such western locations as Chicago, Canada and Netherlands, on the other hand, are also other significant factors that have contributed to the emergence of radicalism and liberalism in Indonesian Islam.

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