Islamic Political Community in Indonesia

ISLAMIC POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN INDONESIA: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Rusli, S.Ag., M.Soc.Sc*

Introduction
In a community where religion is one part of identity, we often find the categorisation of society into traditionalist and modernist. This is particularly due to the fact that every religion has seeds of criticism and resistance. In a Christian community, for instance, there are catholic and protestant groups as a social response to the theology of Christianity. Amongst Hindus, we find some groups that have made every effort to maintain the faith and traditions on one hand, and those that modernise their faith as has happened in India and Bali. The same is also true of Islam. There has been a struggle between those wanting to maintain Islamic traditions and those wanting to modernise the Islamic faith. As a result, conflicts and tensions have emerged between the two opposing groups. In the past, Nahdatul Ulama (NU) was characterised as “traditionalist” and Muhammadiyah as “modernist.” At the grass root level, there are frequently tensions between both sympathisers, as well as in the political arena. In the current situation, however, this categorisation, to a certain degree, is not relevant to the analysis and assessment of the dynamics and discourses on Islamic movements in Indonesia, particularly the Renaissance of Ulama or NU (Nahdatul Ulama) and the Muhammadiyah, due to the recent cross-fertilization and convergence of religious intellectualism that has occurred as a result of improving levels of education.

The dynamics of Islamic society are a unique phenomenon. They have been caused and perpetuated by many influential factors. Therefore, the dynamics in the Middle East are not necessarily the same as those in Indonesia. They are not monolithic, but differ according to theological background and social changes taking place in each country. The purpose of this essay is to answer the questions: What are the different streams within the Indonesian Islamic political community? Why have those different streams emerged?

Typology of Islamic Society
In describing the Islamic community, scholars use different categorisations that are based upon different approaches and disciplines. Kurzman,1 for instance, divided the Islamic community into Customary Islam, Revivalist Islam and Liberal Islam. Customary Islam describes Muslims whose religiosity is still mixed with local cultures and traditions. In the Indonesian context, this community can be traced back to the society that use dupa at night, which is perceived as “sacral”, and also visit most often shrines and “sacral” tombs on the days of nyadran and sekar. Within Geertz’s typology, this group is referred to as Islam abangan (Muslim Javanists).

Revivalist Islam refers to a group of people who hold that Islam is a comprehensive religion. As a sacred book of Muslims, Al-Quran does not ignore social, economic, and political affairs. This group strongly refuses the practices, which are perceived as contradictory to Islam. Their understanding of Islam is literalist and scripturalist. They accept what is stated textually; rarely interpreting the spirit of the religious texts. They wish for the implementation of Islamic sharia totally and comprehensively (kaffah), and they believe it can be achieved if there is an Islamic state. In the Muslim world, we can find this trend in Islamic movements, such as Ikhwanul Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt, the Movement of Islamic Resistance or HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawamat al-Islamiyyah) in Palestine, Front of Islamic Salvation or FIS in Algeria, and Islamic Group Movement or Jama’at Islamiyah in Egypt. In Indonesia, the Holy War Army or Laskar Jihad, the Defender Front of Islam or FPI (Front Pembela Islam), the Movement of Indonesian Mujahidin or AMIN (Angkatan Mujahidin Indonesia), and the Liberation Party or Hizbut Tahrir can be incorporated into this group. They are also referred to as “Islam Sempalan” which is outside mainstream Islamic organizations of the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdatul Ulama.2 Some scholars refer to this movement as “fundamentalist.” However, there are other scholars refusing the use of this term to describe the dynamics of radical movements. Esposito,3 for instance, avoided using this term since, he argued, it was misleading because this movement is a cyclical phenomenon throughout history. Many intellectuals prefer to use terms like “Islamism” or “political Islam,”4 or “militant Islam,”5 or “Islamic resurgence.”6

Liberal Islam, as Kurzman describes,7 is divided into three models; the liberal sharia, the silent sharia and the interpreted sharia. The first model assumes that “the sharia itself is liberal if interpreted properly.” The liberal nature of the sharia is inherent in the Al-Quran and has been proven in history. This means that Islam provides some basic, universal principles of solutions to such global problems as democracy, human rights, gender relations, and relations of inter-religious communities, as stipulated by the Madinah Charter (Mitsaq al-Madinah) at the period of the Prophet Muhammad. The silent sharia holds that “the sharia is silent on certain topics” meaning that there are certain aspects that are not discussed in detail by the sharia. This makes it possible for Muslims to adopt outside models that have to do with public domains, such as forms of state. The interpreted sharia assumes that the sharia contains divine values, but human interpretations of these values are relative. Therefore, the interpretations, which are perceived as biased and deviant from the basic principle of the Quran such as justice and equality, should be reconstructed in order that justice is achieved, particularly in the interpretation of gender relations.

Historically, the map of Islamic thought –be it liberal or traditional, can be traced to the most prominent figure coming from Egypt, Muhammad Abduh. Although he was educated by the traditional Ulama of Al-Azhar University, his thoughts are very progressive and dynamic. From the right wing position of Abduh’s thought, many prominent scholars have come into being using the traditional approaches of understanding Islam including, among others, Muhammad Rasyid Ridha. He played a significant role in fostering intellectuals such as Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna, the founder of Ikhwanul Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood). These figures have influenced the emergence and activity of Islamic movements, such as HAMAS (al-Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiiyah), Jihad Islami (the Islamic War), and Hizbut Tahrir (the Liberation Party). From the left wing position of Abduh, there have emerged such liberal scholars as Qasim Amin, the writer of Tahrir al-Mar’ah (Women’s Liberation) who questioned the classical and traditional interpretation of Ulama about gender relations in Islam, and Ali Abdur Raziq who claimed that the Al-Quran did not talk about the concept of state. These scholars in turn inspired liberal intellectuals including, among others, Hassan Hanafi, the architect of Yasar Islami (the Left Islam) who wrote such books as Ulum al-Istighrab (Occidentalism) and Minal Aqidah ila al-Tsaurah (From the Faith Revolution).

Abduh, in addition to Jamaluddin al-Afghani, had an enormous impact on the founder of Muhammadiyah, KH. Ahmad Dahlan, and to some extent, on KH. Hasyim Asy’ari, the founder of Nahdatul Ulama. Both, together with their organizations, played a dominant role in shaping the traditions of the Islamic community in Indonesia. Nahdatul Ulama has been associated with Muslims in rural areas, therefore, tends to adopt and islamize the local traditions. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah is related to the urban Muslims and tends to be modernist by adopting a western style of education. However, recently there has been a considerable change of religiosity among these groups. Nahdatul Ulama, particularly, the young people have developed a more liberal and progressive understanding of Islam, as has happened with Lakpesdam and LKIS. Within Muhammadiyah itself, which was, for the first time, resentful of local traditions, there has been a trend towards adopting cultural approaches in promulgating the messages of Islam, as it was declared in the Muktamar Muhammadiyah on 24-27 January 2002 in Bali.

On the other hand, some scholars use the categorisation of “formalist” or “scripturalist” and “substantialist” in analysing the Islamic community in Indonesia.8 The others use the social categorisation of “cultural Islam,” “structural Islam” and “political Islam.”9 The latter categorisation is preferred by the author when analysing the Islamic political community in Indonesia on the grounds that it is sociologically inclusive and comprehensive in politically mapping the Islamic community in Indonesia.

Cultural Islam means “Islam focussed on social, intellectual and cultural activities rather than on formal politics.”10 It emphasises socialisation of Islam on changing the consciousness of Muslims and their behaviour without the intervention of the government and without any modification of national systems into Islamic ones. This effort is usually made through social organizations and institutions (eg. Islamic NGOs) and dakwah movements that focus on non-political activities. Although they are not politically involved, their existence has enormous political impacts. Cultural Islam is post-traditional and liberal in orientation. It focuses more on the substance rather than the form. Therefore, the followers are referred to as “substantialists.”11 Liberal and post-traditional Islam makes every effort to present Islam in a more humanist and tolerant light. Liberal Islam had its first moment with Nurcholis Madjid in the 1970s when he came up with the notion of “secularisation” or “desacralization” of the profane institutions such as, most notably, Islamic political parties and an Islamic state.12 He, then, established Paramdina, as a learning centre, which is pluralist and liberal in orientation. In addition, Jaringan Islam Liberal (Islamic Liberal Network) is one website that has played a significant role in spreading the liberal messages of Islam through the Internet or electronic media. One rubric in Jawa Post newspaper, Kajian Utan Kayu has the same trend of spreading a more humanist and tolerant Islam. Meanwhile, a post-traditional approach is used by the youth of NU in Lakpesdam with its journal Tashwirul Afkar and LKIS. They have developed an understanding of Islam by deconstructing the traditional interpretation of Islam and reconstructing another interpretation that is more suitable to the current situation. To some extent, this stream, such as LKIS, uses and develops a Marxist analysis in understanding the phenomena of Islam. For instance, this group has intensively developed the ideas of Hassan Hanafi (the left Islam, Yasar Islami) and Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (a Professor of the Quranic Sciences in Leiden University), prominent figures that use a Marxist approach in analysing Islam.

Structural Islam emphasises the socialisation of Islam through Islamised national systems and public policies. Therefore, despite the fact that this group is not formally active in political parties, they try to influence the government to establish regulations according to Islamic values. The best example of this group is the Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication or DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia) with its Media Dakwah. Another similar group would be the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with Islamic World or KISDI (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam). These groups are referred to as either anti-liberal Islam,13 or “scripturalist”14 in their understanding of Islam and their movements against the Western world, above all, the United States and Israel.

The other examples, which are more radical and conservative, would be Hizbut Tahrir (the Liberation Party) that has international links with groups in the Middle East. As Solahudin argued,15 this group has three stages in achieving its goal. The first stage is marhalat al-tastqif (the stage of guiding and fostering the party cadres). The second stage is marhalah tafa’ul ma’a al-Ummah (the stage of interaction with the community). In this stage, the cadres are sent to the community to give Islamic solutions to problems that the community deals with. It is expected that the community is aware that the only solution to their problems is Islam. The final stage is marhalat istilam al-hukm (the stage of taking over the power). After the community is aware that Islam is the only solution, they are expected to implement the Islamic shari’a, and establish an Islamic state (khilafah Islamiyyah). The same is particularly true of such movements as AMIN (Angkatan Mujahidin Nusantara), Laskar Jihad (the Holy War Army) and the Islamic State of Indonesia or NII (Negara Islam Indonesia).

Political Islam, on the other hand, emphasises that the socialization of Islam through political parties. In the Indonesian political context, this trend can be divided into two different streams, “formalist” and “substantialist.” The formalist political parties are those adopting Islam as a basis for their political platform and agenda. Although there are some parties accepting Pancasila as a basis, if they are based on the Islamic faith (berakidah Islam), they can be incorporated into “formalist” stream. As Platzdasch argued,16 the formalist party tends to be “scripturalist” in its understanding of Islamic teachings. This party has attempted to revive the issue of “Jakarta Charter” or Piagam Jakarta in the Constitution, meaning that a Muslim should live according to the Islamic shari’a. This formalist trend in the Indonesian political arena is represented by the Unity and Development Party or PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), the Crescent-Star Party or PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang) and the Justice Party or PK (Partai Keadilan). In the case of PBB, as Abd A’la argued,17 despite the fact that it formally adopted Islam as a basis, it is not trapped at symbolic slogans. Its orientation and programs are still concerned with the dimension of the values and essence of Islam. It would seem the same is also true of PK. It is interesting to note that although the basis of the formalist parties is Islam, most of them do not aim at establishing an Islamic state, but focus on how far Islam is to be adopted in both national systems and public policies.

“Substantialist” political parties, on the other hand, have the “secular” national ideology, Pancasila, as their sole or joint basis and also use Islamic symbols and principles and draw most of their vote from their santri constituency.18 Among other Islamic “pluralist” parties are the National Awakening Party or PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), which has sympathisers from the NU, and the National Mandate Party or PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional) that has been supported by the Muhammadiyah. Although ideologically these parties are secular and pluralist, they draw Islamic identity to attract support.

However, although there are different emphases on the use of the symbol of Islam between “formalist” and “pluralist” parties, both parties have programs and aims that focus more on functionalist-substantialist rather than legal-formalistic.19 In other words, theoretically, Islamic parties do not aim at establishing an Islamic state, but aim more at how far Islamic values are to be implemented in the existing social and political structure.

Liberalism and Radicalism of Islam: Understanding the Basic Causes
Why have liberalism and radicalism emerged in Indonesia? To answer this question, it is important to look at two significant factors, internal and external. The internal factor is one that is inherent in the Islamic teaching itself, where Islam is a multi-interpretative religion. The Al-Quran, as a primary source, by nature contains multiple meanings. We can easily find in the Al-Quran references to republicanism, monarchy, democracy and authoritarianism. Human beings are just agents in understanding the purposes of the sacred texts. Since the intellectual capacities and psychological conditions of human beings are different, differences emerge in the interpretation. Some tend to understand and hold the literal meaning of the text; therefore, “literalist” or “scripturalist” groups emerge, while others tend to look at the substance and essence of the text, so, the “liberal” or “substantialist” groups come into being.

The external factors would be, first of all, modernisation and modernity. The mergence of Islamic radicalism and liberalism in Indonesia is inseparable from this modernity. They differ in responding to modernity, which comes particularly from the west. There is no doubt that modernity brought about changes in the social structures of the society –be it negative or positive. “Radical” or “fundamentalist” (the term mostly used by the West) or “revivalist Islam” perceives modernity as destructive of Muslim morality and ethics. This is also regarded as the “Anti-God movement.” Modernity, in this group’s point of view, has led to a crisis of identity and morality among Muslims, which, in turn has caused them to become deprived and alienated. Therefore, they most often regard this era as “Jahiliyah modern.” As a result, the struggle to resist modernity surfaces in a variety of forms and at number of levels -be they personal or political. At the individual level, there is an increase in “devotion” or santri-isation (literally ‘becoming more devout’) which is manifested in such things as increasing participation in prayer and pilgrimage, greater observance of fasting during the month of Ramadhan and payment of alms tax, growth in mystical order and in the circles of Islamic learning (halaqah) as we could find in the Mosque of Salman in the Institute of Technology Bandung or ITB, the Mosque of Arief Rachman Hakim in the University of Indonesia or UI, and other mosques around Indonesian campuses. This heightened religiosity was also accompanied by an increased use of head covering and modest dress for women, particularly in urban areas. At the political level, there has been a significant increase in awareness of the significance of the implementation of Islamic shari’a in all aspects of life. This has generated a radical and conservative orientation. Some of devout Muslims chose, among others, the Justice Party or PK (Partai Keadilan) as their political basis, while others used radical movements to islamise public policies and establish an Islamic state. However, there are also positive responses to modernity, particularly from Muslims who were educated at western universities. They argued that Islam is not in contradiction with modernity. They were, thus, referred to as followers of Cultural Islam which is more pluralist and open to western knowledge and civilisation.

The other factor would be the increasing number of students who were sent to study not only in Mecca and Medina, but also in Cairo, particularly in the early twentieth century. Cairo with Al-Azhar University has long been known as the centre of Islamic learning. Most graduates returning home brought knowledge that was influenced by Muhammad Abduh, who was considered as a symbol for a reformed Islam.20 These graduates, to some extent, play a role in colouring Islamic thought in Indonesia –be they conservative or moderate. In addition, many students from the Islamic boarding school, such as Gontor, were sent to study in western universities, such as Chicago, McGill, and Leiden University in the Netherlands, which is still continuing as the Netherlands-Indonesian Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS).21 These graduates including, among others, Nurcholis Madjid (Chicago) and Amien Rais (Chicago), are known as the figures who have presented a more humanist and pluralist Islam, and who are concerned with human rights issues and fiercely criticize the government.22 Therefore, in the history of Islamic discourse, they are regarded as Substantialists or Liberal Islam.

Conclusion
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that there are many categorisations made by scholars and intellectuals in analysing the Muslim community in the world in general and in Indonesia in particular. Kurzman sociologically categorised the typology of the Muslim community into Customary Islam, Revivalist Islam, and Liberal Islam. These three categories have different orientations and ways of understanding Islam. On the other hand, in mapping the political Islamic community in Indonesia, it is appropriate to use the categorisation of Cultural Islam, Structural Islam and Political Islam. Cultural Islam is Islam that focuses on intellectual, social and cultural activities rather than on formal politics. It is represented by Muslims who have a liberal and pluralist theological orientation. Structural Islam argues Islam should be socialised into national systems and public policies. On the other hand, Political Islam emphasises the significance of political parties in implementing Islamic values within society. This political Islam is divided into “formalist” that endorses Islam as the basis for its political platform and agenda, and “pluralist” that has a “secular” ideology, Pancasila, as its sole or joint basis. Although these parties are different in terms of symbolisation of Islam, they do not aim at establishing an Islamic state, but at how far Islamic values are to be implemented within the social and political structure.

The reasons behind the emergence of radicalism and liberalism in Islam may be the Islamic teaching itself that is multi-interpretive. There is no single interpretation in Islam. Therefore, it is inevitable that “scripturalist” and “substantialist” trends emerge. The different responses to modernity and the growth of santri studying in Mecca, Medina and Egypt, on the one hand, and in such western locations as Chicago, Canada and Netherlands, on the other hand, are also other significant factors that have contributed to the emergence of radicalism and liberalism in Indonesian Islam.

* Lecturer of The Department of Shari'ah at STAIN Datokarama Palu, Central Sulawesi
1 Charles Kurzman (ed), Liberal Islam: A Source Book, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 1-30
2 Solahuddin, “Menulusuri Kelompok Islam Sempalan (1): Mereka Dituduh Menebar Bom,” Detik.com (accessed 10: 01 :2001)
3 Jhon L. Esposito, Islam: the Straight Path, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988)
4 Ibid.; Fred Halliday, “The Politics of Islamic Fundamentalism: Iran, Tunisia, and the Challenge to the Secular State,” in Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan (eds), Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994); Bobby S. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism, (London and New York: Zed Books, 1997)
5 G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam, (London & Sydney: Pan Books, 1976)
6 Manning Nash, “Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia and Indonesia” in Fundamentalism Observed, M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby (eds), (Chicago and London: the University of Chicago Press, 1991); James P. Piscatori, “The Nature of Islamic Revival” in Islam in a World of Nation-States, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986)
7 Kurzman, Liberal, pp. 13-18
8 Bactiar Effendy, “Antara Substansialisme dan Formalisme,” Panji Masyarakat, No. 40, Tahun III, Special Edition, 2002; R. William Liddle, Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996); M. Dien Syamsuddin, “Kiprah Politik Islam di Indonesia: Amal Jariah yang Tergadaikan,” Panji Masyarakat, No. 40, Tahun III, Special Edition, 2000
9 Robert W. Hefner, “Islamization and Democratisation in Indonesia,” in Islam in an Era of Nation States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia, Hefner, RW and Horvatich, P. (eds), (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997); Greg Fealy, “Islamic Politics: A Rising or Declining Force,” Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition,” Damien Kingsbury and Arief Budiman (eds), (Adelaide: Crawford House, 2001); Masykuri Abdillah, “Islam Politik dan Islam Kultural,” Kompas, Friday 2 July 1999
10 Feally, Islamic, p.120
11 Liddle, Leadership.
12 Hefner, Islamization, pp. 82-3
13 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratisation in Indonesia, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000)
14 Liddle, Leadership.
15 Solahuddin, Menulusuri.
16 Bernhard Platzdasch, “Radical or Reformist? How Islamic will the new movements make Indonesia,” Inside Indonesia, Oct-Dec 2001
17 Abd A’la, “Partai-partai Islam Saat Ini: Antara Formalisme dan Pengembangan Nilai-nilai Islam,” Kompas, 24 June 1999
18 Fealy, Islamic, p. 122
19 M. Arskal Salim, “Partai Islam di Pemilu 1999,” Kompas, 26 April 1999
20 Karel Steenbrink, “Itinerant Scholars,” Inside Indonesia, No. 52, October-December 1997
21 Ibid.
22 George Aditjondro, “How Muslims will say ‘No,” Inside Indonesia, No. 52, October-December 1997